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Abstract 
There is some debate about how many stocks can effectively eliminate most of the 
unsystematic risk in an equity portfolio.  Estimates range from 10 to 40.  Given the 
growing proliferation of pooled investment vehicles aimed at the UK’s pension fund 
industry, where these pools consist of various combinations of alternative asset 
classes and alternative investment strategies, in this paper we investigate the limits 
of diversification amongst these less conventional investments.  Our results indicate 
that 40% of the time series risk can be eliminated by combining 8 strategies, but only 
a further 4% from combining 12.  We also find that an investor could reduce 60% of 
the dispersion in terminal wealth of an alternative investment basket – which is 
arguably what investors should really be concerned with – by combining 6 of these 
less conventional asset approaches to investment, but only a further 20% by 
combining 15. 
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1. Introduction 
“Don’t put all your eggs in one basket” is advice that our grandmothers’ might have 
given to us and, who in turn, might have received the same advice from their own 
grandmothers.  This advice was formalised in an investment context by Markowitz 
and others in the 1950s.  By constructing portfolios with assets that were imperfectly 
correlated with one another, Markowitz et al demonstrated that the risk inherent in 
the portfolio would decline as successive assets were added to it, until eventually the 
volatility of the portfolio would equate to the average covariance of the assets 
comprising the portfolio.  This work therefore highlighted the importance of the 
covariance of returns between assets, and drew a distinction between undiversifiable 
and diversifiable risk, where the latter could be progressively eliminated by adding 
more and more assets to the portfolio.  The work therefore explained how investors 
could take advantage of one of the few free lunches available in economics.   
 
But how many stocks would produce a portfolio with only undiversifiable risk ?  This 
question was first addressed by Evans and Archer (1968).  Randomly drawing 
equities from a pool of assets to construct a large number of n-asset portfolios, their 
results indicated that most of the diversifiable risk could be eliminated by forming 
portfolios of eight to ten randomly selected stocks.  Reference to this result can be 
found in all basic finance text books.  Since that time many other researchers have 
addressed the same question2.  In much later work Statman (1987) concluded that 
the number was closer to thirty or forty stocks.  However, even in the event that the 
number is double Statman’s estimate many mutual fund investors could still be said 
to be overdiversified, that is, holding portfolios of more assets than are required to 
reduce diversifiable risk to zero, effectively paying higher transactions charges to 
manage more assets than they need to hold. 
 
LHabitant and Learned (2002) pose the same question but with respect to hedge 
funds.  For investors looking to invest in hedge fund of funds, how many hedge funds 
should be included in this basket ? Using broadly the same approach and 
techniques, drawing individual hedge funds randomly from the TASS database they 
conclude that in terms of naive diversification, that most of the diversification benefits 
                                                 
2
 See for example Elton and Gruber (1977), Lorie (1975), Tole (1982), or O’Neal (1997). 
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are achieved by forming fund of funds comprising just five to ten individual hedge 
funds.  In this paper we too extend the original work of Evans & Archer but in the 
context of a range of alternative asset classes or alternative strategies rather than to 
either individual stocks or hedge funds3.   
 
In this paper we specify a pool of possible alternative investments that include all 
those strategies and classes that UK pension funds have invested in already, and/or 
comprise the alternative pooled vehicles that are currently available to them.  From 
this pool we randomly create portfolios consisting of 2 to 23 of these asset classes, 
using 100,000 draws for each set of n-asset portfolios.  Our results indicate that 40% 
of the time series risk can be eliminated by combining 8 asset classes, but only a 
further 4% from combining 12.  We also find that an investor could reduce 60% of the 
dispersion in terminal wealth – which is arguably what investors should really be 
concerned with – by combining 6 of these less conventional approaches to 
investment, but only a further 20% by combining 15. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we outline the data, our 
methodology and the tests we use to analyse the issues above; in Section 3 we 
present a discussion of main results and findings; and in Section 4 we conclude the 
paper. 
 
2. Motivation 
The question of how many alternative asset classes might constitute a sufficient 
number to diversify unsystematic risk is of more than just academic interest.  Over 
the past few years, in response to the growing demand of UK pension funds, asset 
managers have launched pooled investment vehicles that consist of a range of 
alternative asset classes and alternative investment strategies (see Appendix 1).  
The raison d’etre for such investment vehicles is that many small and medium-sized 
pension funds do not have sufficient expertise to choose and monitor a range of 
alternative investment, nor sufficient assets to invest in the range of alternatives that 
say the Yale University endowment fund holds in its portfolio.  Furthermore, there 
                                                 
3Throughout this paper we refer to ‘alternative asset classes’, by this we mean both distinct asset 
classes, such as infrastructure, but also to alternative investment strategies, as represented by the 
hedge fund indices in our work. 
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seems little doubt that if these products prove to be successful retail versions of the 
products will follow. 
 
But the issues surrounding the construction of a such an investment vehicle, are far 
more significant than even those related to constructing a fund of hedge funds, and 
certainly more significant than those involved in constructing ordinary mutual funds.  
There are a whole range of difficult, practical issues involved including: a range of 
liquidity considerations; the tax treatment of the alternatives, which may vary 
considerably; and perhaps most significantly issues surrounding pricing.  Given these 
issues it is even more crucial to establish how many alternative investments are 
sufficient to reduce unsystematic risk to an acceptable level. Too few could leave 
investors exposed to unnecessarily high levels of risk. Too many could lead to 
excessive management costs. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1.  Data 
We have created a database consisting of the total returns on 24 alternative 
investment categories.  The definition of an alternative investment may vary 
depending upon the investor.  However, until recently for most UK pension funds the 
vast majority of their asset portfolios consisted of UK equities, and UK government 
bonds, the “alternative” to these asset classes was generally an investment in 
overseas developed economy, large cap equities mainly in the USA, Europe (ex UK) 
and Japan.  In our set of alternatives we therefore include indices representing the 
returns on investments in emerging market equities and on small cap stocks.  Along 
with these two equity indices we encompass hedge funds, private equity, 
commodities, property, high yield and emerging market bonds, currency, managed 
futures and infrastructure.  The full list of indices used to proxy the returns and risks 
on these strategies along with their sources are shown in Table 1. 
 
In designing any experiment of this nature we could clearly have chosen other 
subsets of these asset classes and strategies.  However, we needed indices that 
were available in total return formats and also that had a fairly significant time series 
history.  All of the indices used and represented in Table 1 are available in a monthly 
format going back to at least January 1995.  In Table 2 we present some basic 
 4
descriptive statistics on these indices, where the statistics are based upon monthly 
data from January 1995 to December 2007. 
 
2.2.  Methodology 
Using the in-sample returns on the indices listed in tables 1 and 2 we create equally 
weighted portfolios of increasing size n (n=2 to 23) by randomly selecting indices 
from our data set. These portfolios are rebalanced annually with the total portfolio 
value at the end of December each year redistributed equally among the constituent 
indices. For each portfolio, we build a time series of returns and use it to generate 
various statistics (compound annual return, volatility, skewness, kurtosis etc). For 
each portfolio size, this process is repeated 100,000 times to obtain 100,000 
observations of each statistic. This is necessary not only to estimate the mean 
behaviour of a portfolio of size n, but also to examine the cross sectional variation in 
the results – something which is not typically reported in such exercises. 
 
But as well as calculating the standard moments for the time series properties of the 
portfolios we also focus on “downside risk”.  We calculate measures of downside 
deviation, semi-deviation and loss standard deviation.  However, the results and the 
conclusions that one might draw from each of these sets of statistics were not 
materially different and so we report the results for downside deviation which is 
defined as follows: 
 
Downside deviation = 
( ) 1/2N
1i
2
MARi
n
rr
⎟⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −∑=
    (1) 
 
where ri is the return for period i, n is the number of periods, rMAR is the “minimum 
acceptable return” which can be defined by the user and where if (ri – rMAR) ≥ 0.0 then 
(ri – rMAR) is set equal to 0.0.   We set rMAR to be equal to zero.  For hedge fund 
analysis this number is often set as the target, or hurdle rate of return. 
 
The statistics above are all designed to help understand the risk profile of a basket of 
alternatives.  However, investors will also be interested to understand how this 
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basket behaves relative to traditional asset classes.  In other words, how does the 
correlation between any portfolio of n alternatives and say a portfolio of long-only 
equities change as the number of alternatives in the basket also changes ?  We 
therefore calculate the correlation over the full sample of each portfolio of alternatives 
with the return on the S&P 500 composite index and on the MSCI World equity index. 
 
Terminal wealth statistics 
However, in considering the number of mutual funds necessary to reduce risk to its 
undiversifiable minimum, O’Neal (1997) argued that investors should not only 
consider the time series properties of their portfolios, as we do above by calculating 
these statistics, but also their terminal values.  And more specifically the distribution 
of that terminal value.   
 
The intuition behind this is as follows.  One could be unfortunate enough to get in to a 
taxi and enjoy a very smooth ride, but ultimately not arrive at one’s chosen 
destination.  A traveller may instead be willing to put up with a bumpy cab ride that 
does get them to their chosen destination.  In an investment context then investors 
should care at least as much about the dispersion of their terminal wealth as they do 
the volatility of that wealth over time.  Since long-term investors like pension funds 
should be focussed on the end result, or the value of their “terminal wealth” we follow 
O’Neal and calculate a set of additional statistics to explore the impact of 
diversification among alternatives on the distribution of terminal wealth outcomes. 
These include: a measure of short fall probability; the mean of this shortfall; and also 
the semi-variance of portfolio returns.   
 
We define shortfall probability as: 
 
n
rbelow  nsobservatio of Numberyprobabilit Shortfall =  (2) 
 
where r  is the equally weighted average return over the whole sample of all 24 
alternative asset classes or strategies, and n is the number of observations. 
However, it is one thing to know the probability of a shortfall, but the scale of the 
likely shortfall is also important.  We calculate the mean portfolio shortfall as follows: 
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 ∑= −= n1i i n rrshortfall  Mean       (3) 
 
where ri is the return on portfolio i.   
 
For the measure of downside risk we follow L’Habitant and Learned (2002) we 
calculate a measure of the semi-deviation of the dispersion of terminal wealth.  This 
measure is also consistent with the measures of shortfall probability and mean 
shortfall.  The statistic is defined as follows: 
 
Semi-deviation = 
( ) 1/2
l
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where ni is the number of periods where ri is below r  and where if (ri – r ) ≥ 0.0 then 
(ri – r ) is set equal to 0.0.    
 
4.  Results 
4.1. Time-series portfolio properties  
In Chart 1 we present the average (mean and median) values for the nominal annual 
return on the n-asset portfolios.  The average (as one might expect from random 
sampling) is fairly stable and converges quickly on the equally-weighted average of 
the nominal return of all 24 indices over the full sample period, approximately 
12.5%pa. 
 
In Chart 2 we present an analogous chart, but using the time series standard 
deviation of the same set of portfolios as the metric.  The first point to note is that the 
average standard deviation line traces the familiar “L” shaped pattern, falling quite 
rapidly at the start and levelling off after the once n reaches between eight to ten.  In 
Chart 3 we plot the marginal change in average portfolio standard deviation as we 
move progressively into portfolios with higher numbers of asset classes.  By the time 
we reach 8 asset classes the average standard deviation has been reduced by 40%, 
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but only by 45% by the time there are 14 asset classes in the portfolios. The marginal 
benefit in terms of risk reduction of investing in more than 8 strategies is therefore 
relatively small. And these benefits may be outweighed by the marginal costs of 
managing more strategies. 
 
Taken together one might also conclude that say five asset classes are sufficient to 
get most of the benefits of diversification since once n equals 5, 35% of the volatility 
has been removed from the average portfolio.  However, the maximum and minimum 
lines in Chart 2 show how this would be a riskier approach since the spread of 
possible standard deviation outcomes is much wider than for say an 8 asset class 
approach, at least with a random choice of these alternatives. 
 
In Chart 4 we present the average, maximum and minimum skews of these portfolios.  
The skew for an equally weighted portfolio of these alternatives is negative; but the 
average skew of the portfolios becomes progressively worse, rather than improving 
as the numbers of asset classes increases.  This means that in terms of mean skew 
investors would be better off with fewer rather than more alternatives asset classes in 
their investment basket.  This is consistent with the results of Amin and Kat (2002) 
who found that for portfolios of hedge funds, increasing the number of funds not only 
lowered the standard deviation but also increased the negative skewness of the fund 
of funds.  They found that this increase in negative skewness was the result of the 
co-skewness between the returns.  However, the dispersion of skew experience 
narrows significantly as the minimum and maximum skew lines show in the Chart. 
 
In Chart 5 we present the downside deviation of the portfolios.  Arguably, it is this 
element of risk that investors usually wish to avoid.  This chart also shows how the 
marginal benefit of adding more alternatives declines as the number of alternatives in 
the portfolio rises.  The majority o the downside deviation is reduced with a portfolio 
of six to eight alternatives; a result that suggests that a smaller number of 
alternatives might be suitable if investors wish to reduce the downside risk over time 
of their basket of alternatives. 
 
As well as understanding the time series properties of these alternative portfolios, it is 
also important to understand how they might behave relative to an asset class that 
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they may be designed to replace or to which they may be combined.  To understand 
this aspect of investing in these alternatives, we calculated the full sample correlation 
of the portfolios with both the S&P500 composite and MSCI World equity indices.  
The average results of these calculations are shown in Chart 6.  The average 
correlation rises quite sharply as we move from one or two alternatives to eight to 
ten.  For our set of alternatives the mean correlation is always below 60% for the 
S&P500 and reaches just over 65% when the MSCI index is used.  Given the very 
high correlation between developed economy equity markets these much lower 
levels of correlation may be attractive to investors.  Chart 7 shows the variation of the 
correlation coefficient, by plotting the mean correlation for the S&P500 along with the 
associated minimum and maximum correlation statistics.  The range is very large.  
Between portfolios consisting of 0ne to eight alternatives, the minimum correlation is 
negative.  But arguably it is the range above the mean that is more relevant, since 
lower levels of correlation with any equity investment are probably to be welcomed.  
This maximum correlation (from 100,000 draws) is fairly stable at around 70 to 75% 
for most of the n-asset portfolios.  This may be sufficiently low for many investors, 
depending upon their investment objectives. 
 
3.2. Terminal wealth statistics  
Investors are naturally concerned about how bumpy the journey to their end point 
proves to be, but ultimately they would like to know that they will at least make it to 
their final destination.  In this exercise we choose the last observation of our data 
sample, December 2007, to be our chosen end point.  In Chart 8 we plot the 
standard deviation of terminal wealth at this end point, and in Chart 9 the marginal 
change in this measure of risk.  
 
These results contrast sharply with charts 2 and 3 for the time series standard 
deviation of returns.  Eight asset classes were enough to reduce the time series 
standard deviation by 40% whereas for the terminal wealth standard deviation this 
reduction is almost 65%.  Beyond 8 assets the reduction in time series standard 
deviation is marginal, but for the terminal wealth measure adding another 10 
alternatives leads to a further 20% reduction in volatility. 
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These results have important implications for an investor seeking to invest in 
alternative asset classes. Although diversifying beyond 8 assets offers extremely 
marginal benefits in terms of time series standard deviation, if the investor wants 
more certainty that the risk level they expect is the one that they actually experience 
(as measured by the standard deviation of terminal wealth) then they should diversify 
much more.   
 
The dispersion in wealth at the end of our sample period, as measured by the 
standard deviation of terminal wealth takes into account both positive and negative 
deviations from the mean.  However investors will naturally be less concerned about 
outcomes above then mean than those below it.  For this reason we examine the 
shortfall probability in Chart 10. The benchmark we use is the mean return on the 24 
investment strategies which is 11.01%.  Since 10 of the alternatives have a 
compound annual return of less than this, if only one asset class is chosen there is a 
42% chance that the return will be lower than the mean. Thereafter the shortfall 
probability declines in an almost linear fashion as more indices are added to the 
portfolio from 42% to zero. If for example an investor chose to invest in only 5 
strategies, based on the reduction in time series standard deviation, they would still 
have a 33% chance of achieving a return lower than the mean.  Once again this 
illustrates that a more diverse approach might be prudent. 
 
The major shortcoming of the shortfall probability is that it does not account of the 
magnitude by which returns fall short of the mean, for this reason we calculate the 
mean shortfall shown in Chart 11.  If only one alternative is chosen then the mean 
shortfall is 5.0% per annum which equates to an 88.6% total return over our 13 year 
sample period. Combining the mean shortfall with the shortfall probability we can see 
that a portfolio of 5 strategies has a 33% chance of returning 1.6%pa (23% total 
return) below the mean which is clearly substantial. 
 
Finally, in Chart 12 we presents the semi-deviation statistics for the terminal wealth o 
the portfolio, since investors will probably be more concerned about not achieving 
their target return than beating the target at their chosen terminal date.  The results 
are broadly consistent with those presented above, with the vast majority of benefit 
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achieved in terms of the reduction of portfolio semi-deviation by the time n equals six; 
and certainly by the time n equals eight. 
 
4. Conclusions  
Our results show that increased diversification significantly decreases the time series 
standard deviation of the portfolios, but that the marginal decrease from adding more 
alternatives decreases rapidly.  This implies that if an investor is only concerned with 
this element of risk they should hold a portfolio of between eight and ten alternatives.  
However for investors with long-term investment horizons the dispersion of terminal 
wealth outcomes might be a more appropriate measure.  Here we find that holding 
more than the number of alternatives suggested by considering the time series 
standard deviation might be preferable.  The downside to this reduction in the 
dispersion in terminal wealth is that it may come at the cost of increased negative 
skew in portfolio returns over time. 
 
These results represent a first step to understanding the limits to the benefits of naive 
diversification that might exist with regard to building a portfolio of alternative asset 
classes and or alternative investment strategies.  And given the interest amongst 
institutional investors in this investment alternative investment universe, we believe 
our results will be of interest to such investors, to their advisors and to the product 
providers seeking to satisfy this investment need.  
 
However, unlike the related studies that have sought to establish the limits to 
diversification with regard to portfolios of individual equities or hedge fund of funds, 
our results are hampered to some extent by the limited number of alternative asset 
classes and strategies and in particular by the availability of suitable time series 
proxies for the investment experience in each.  We constructed a database of 24 
such proxies.  Over time however it will be possible to revisit these results to see 
whether our basic conclusions hold as the alternative universe continues to expand 
encompassing new strategies as it does so.  
 
So how many how many alternative eggs should you put in your investment basket ?  
There is no definitive answer since it will ultimately depend on investor attitudes to 
risk, and to their objectives, but overall it is probably around eight ! 
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Chart 2:  Portfolio standard deviation 
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Chart 3:  Marginal change in portfolio standard deviation 
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Chart 4:  Portfolio skewness 
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Chart 5:  Downside deviation 
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Chart 6:  Alternatives and equity market correlation 
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Chart 7:  Alternatives and S&P500 correlation, max and min 
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Chart 8: Standard deviation of terminal wealth 
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
St
an
da
rd
 
de
vi
at
io
n
 o
f t
er
m
in
al
 w
e
al
th
 
Chart 9: Marginal change in standard deviation of terminal wealth 
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Chart 10: Shortfall probability of terminal wealth 
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Sh
or
tfa
ll p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 
Chart 11: Mean shortfall of terminal wealth 
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Chart 12: Semi-deviation of terminal wealth 
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Table 1: Set of alternative indices 
 
   
 Alternative  Sub category Index constructed by 
 
   
1 Equities Emerging equities Thomson Financial 
2 
 Small Cap Dow Jones Wilshire 
3 Hedge funds FoF CSFB Tremont 
4 
 Equity market neutral CSFB Tremont 
5 
 Event driven CSFB Tremont 
6 
 Fixed income arbitrage CSFB Tremont 
7 
 Global macro CSFB Tremont 
8 
 Long/short equity CSFB Tremont 
9 Commodities Energy Dow Jones AIG 
10 
 Agriculture Dow Jones AIG 
11 
 Industrial metals Dow Jones AIG 
12 
 Gold S&P GSCI 
13 
 Timber NBS 
14 Commercial property US FTSE EPRA 
15 
 Europe FTSE EPRA 
16 
 UK FTSE EPRA 
17 
 Asia FTSE EPRA 
18 UK residential property UK Residential Fathom Financial Consulting 
19 Bonds High Yield Lehman Brothers 
20 
 Emerging Market Debt Merrill Lynch 
21 Currency  Barclays Capital 
22 Managed futures  BTOP 
23 Infrastructure  MSCI 
24 Private Equity   Thomson Financial 
 
   
Source: Thomson Financial 
 
 17
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  Return St.dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
 
     
1 Emerging equities 24.81% 35.0% -0.17 7.07 
2 Small Cap 11.99% 18.5% -0.53 4.01 
3 FoF 12.33% 7.4% 0.12 5.83 
4 Equity market neutral 10.94% 2.7% 0.46 3.66 
5 Event driven 12.77% 5.5% -3.64 29.20 
6 Fixed income arbitrage 6.74% 3.6% -3.17 20.79 
7 Global macro 15.46% 10.4% 0.03 6.75 
8 Long/short equity 13.93% 9.9% 0.15 7.34 
9 Energy 10.30% 32.0% 0.31 3.53 
10 Agriculture -1.77% 15.5% 0.20 3.06 
11 Industrial metals 4.50% 18.9% 0.65 4.14 
12 Gold 6.43% 13.7% 0.81 4.45 
13 Timber -0.25% 4.1% -0.32 6.60 
14 US Property 14.87% 14.5% -0.58 3.87 
15 Europe Property 15.67% 13.0% -0.39 3.61 
16 UK Property 9.48% 16.5% -0.11 2.65 
17 Asia Property 11.70% 23.8% 0.51 9.75 
18 UK Residential 18.10% 1.8% 0.69 3.15 
19 High Yield 11.16% 8.7% 0.07 8.99 
20 Emerging Market Debt 13.67% 13.8% -2.88 23.79 
21 Currency 5.05% 6.4% 1.15 4.83 
22 Managed futures 8.29% 9.4% 0.28 3.49 
23 Infrastructure 14.24% 16.5% -0.32 4.26 
24 Private Equity  13.87% 13.0% -0.43 5.00 
      
Source: Thomson Financial 
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Appendix 1 
 
Asset manager Pooled Alternative Investment Product 
Credit Suisse Credit Suisse Nova Diversified Growth 
Schroders Schroder Diversified Growth 
JP Morgan JP Morgan Life Diversified Growth 
Morley Fund Management Morley Diversified Strategy 
Newton Phoenix Newton Phoenix Multi-Asset 
Merrill Lynch Merrill Lynch Target Return 
Fidelity International Fidelity Diversified Growth Fund 
Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs Balanced Strategy 
UBS UBS Targeted Return 
Insight Investments Insight Diversified Target 
Baring Asset Management  Baring MM (Reduced, Optimum & Extended Risk) 
 
 
  
 
